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Abstract
An electronic auction protocol will only be used by those who trust
that it operates correctly. Therefore, e-auction protocols must be verifi-
able: seller, buyer and losing bidders must all be able to determine that
the result was correct. We pose that the importance of verifiability for
e-auctions necessitates a formal analysis. Consequently, in the first part
of the talk, we identify notions of verifiability for each stakeholder. We
formalize these and then use the developed framework to study the ver-
ifiability of several examples. We provide an analysis of the protocol by
Sako in the applied pi-calculus with help of ProVerif, finding it to be cor-
rect. Additionally we identify issues with the protocols due to Curtis et
al. and Brandt.
In the second part, we will analyze the protocol by Brandt in more
detail. We show first that this protocol – when using malleable interactive
zero-knowledge proofs – is vulnerable to attacks by dishonest bidders.
Such bidders can manipulate the publicly available data in a way that
allows the seller to deduce all participants’ bids. Additionally we discuss
attacks on non-repudiation, fairness and the privacy of individual bidders
exploiting authentication problems.
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